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RETHINKING MISTAKE AND NONDISCLOSURE
IN CONTRACT LAW
Jeffrey L. Harrison*
INTRODUCTION
In contract law, the issues of when there has been a unilateral mistake
and whether one party has an obligation to disclose information are fre-
quently two sides of the same coin. When one party claims there has been a
unilateral mistake, the claim is often made that the other party knew of the
misperception and could have spoken up but elected not to. This eventuality
gives rise to the oft-discussed question of when a party must disclose in-
formation that will likely alter the terms of an exchange or prevent it from
occurring at all." On one hand, the answer to this question is easy. Both
logic and economic theory support the view that individuals and firms are
more likely to make mutually beneficial decisions as the level of informa-
tion increases.' This suggests a default rule of requiring full disclosure of
any relevant information.
* Stephen C. O'Connell Chair and Professor of Law, University of Florida.
The problem of unilateral mistake is addressed by section 153 of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981). The critical question under section
153 is whether the party claiming unilateral mistake assumed the risk of the mistake as defined under
section 154 of the Restatement. Id. § 153; see also id. § 154. These matters are closely related to section
161, which concerns the question of when nondisclosure will be regarded as a misrepresentation. In
general, nondisclosure will be a misrepresentation when one party is responsible for a misunderstanding
by the other party and does not correct it or one party has a reasonable expectation that the opposite
party will disclose certain information. Id. § 161; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551
(1977) (describing liability for nondisclosure of information and reflecting the same theme as found in
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts).
2 Two concepts of efficiency come into play here. The condition of perfect competition-rarely,
if ever, achieved-requires perfect or complete information. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN,
LAW & ECONOMICS 301 (5th ed. 2008); see also id. at 293 ("Efficiency requires uniting knowledge and
control over resources at least cost .... " (emphasis omitted)). When there are information imbalances,
the buyer or seller may possess market power. See id. at 301. Market power results in resources not
being allocated to their most valued uses. See id.; see also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET
POWER HANDBOOK: COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS 1 (2005). Economics calls this
"allocative inefficiency." See COOTER & ULEN, supra, at 301; JEFFREY L. HARRISON & JULES
THEEUWES, LAW & ECONOMICS 22-23 (2008); Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust:
Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1025, 1027
(1987) ("Allocative efficiency is achieved when the existing stock of goods and productive output are
allocated through the price system to those buyers who value them most, in terms of willingness to pay
or willingness to forego other consumption.").
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. On the other hand, a disclosure requirement-say, a golden rule of
disclosure requiring parties to disclose information they would want to hear
if they were on the other side of the bargain-means that the possessor of
valuable information will lose whatever gain can be attributed to the supe-
rior information. This outcome would seem unimportant unless the infor-
mation were the product of a deliberate and perhaps expensive effort. In
these cases, an inability to profit from the information or internalize bene-
fits of the information-producing effort will discourage the production of
information. This type of investment is particularly important when it in-
volves the discovery of goods, products, or services that are undervalued
and which have more productive uses. As a simple example, there would be
little motivation to identify and purchase oil-producing land if buyers were
required to disclose the true value of the land to sellers.
The disclosure problem was explained in elegant terms over thirty
years ago by Professor Anthony Kronman in his classic article, Mistake,
Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts.3 In that article, Profes-
sor Kronman fashioned a compromise that seemed to balance these two
interests and that he maintained was recognized by the common law.4 Ac-
cording to Professor Kronman, the economically sensible solution to the
In addition, "Pareto superiority" refers to a resource reallocation-like a contract-that leaves
at least one party better off while leaving no one worse off. COOTER & ULEN, supra, at 47; Jeffrey L.
Harrison, Piercing Pareto Superiority: Real People and the Obligations of Legal Theory, 39 ARIz. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1997); see also DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER 24 (2000); HARRISON & THEEUWES,
supra, at 26. This outcome is more likely to occur when parties have complete information. There are
complexities here, however, that will not be addressed in this Article. For example, what does "better
off' mean? Is it how one feels or how one actually is? Is it that one anticipates being better off by virtue
of the contract or that one turns out to be better off? See generally Harrison, supra, at 14 (discussing
Pareto superiority and concluding that "[t]he issue, though, is one of determining what sorts of things go
into the sense of being 'better off."').
3 Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 2 (1978) (arguing that deliberately acquired information should enjoy a right to nondisclosure
in contract law). Professor Kronman's work has been cited repeatedly by legal scholars. A recent Wes-
tlaw search revealed 262 citations. Interestingly, the article is cited, as determined by a Westlaw search,
only nine times by courts at any level. Six of these citations were by Judge Richard Posner and two by
Judge Frank Easterbrook. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522,
528 (7th Cir. 1985) (containing a citation to Kronman's article by Judge Easterbrook). Typically the
Seventh Circuit citations are not related to the holdings of the cases.
It is important to note, as suggested above, that the issues involved may arise under contract and
tort theories. See supra note 1. The cases themselves, however, arise in the context of contracts.
4 For a discussion of Professor Kronman's theory see KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS:
EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 32-35, 111-26 (1988); Christopher T. Wonnell, The
Structure of a General Theory of Nondisclosure, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 329, 340-42 (1991). See also
Alex M. Johnson, Jr., An Economic Analysis of the Duty to Disclose Information: Lessons Learnedfrom
the Caveat Emptor Doctrine, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 86-100 (2008) (reviewing three theories that
pertain to disclosure and nondisclosure in the context of real estate transactions). See also Steven Sha-
veil, Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale, 25 RAND J. ECON. 20 (1994) (distin-
guishing buyers and seller with respect to impact of disclosure requirements).
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problem is to distinguish between information that is deliberately acquired
and that which is casually acquired.' He defines deliberately acquired in-
formation as information "whose acquisition entails costs which would not
have been incurred but for the likelihood, however great, that the informa-
tion in question would actually be produced."6 Casually acquired informa-
tion, according to Professor Kronman, may also be the result of incurring
costs, but the costs in question would have been incurred even if the infor-
mation had not been acquired.7 It may be more appropriate to view this as
incidentally acquired information.8
According to Professor Kronman, the law generally does not require
parties to disclose deliberately acquired information.9 Whether or not the
theory actually explains the law is, of course, a different matter. Neverthe-
less, the basic idea is that the common law generally permits the party who
has invested in developing or gathering information to internalize the gains
those efforts make available.'0 Intellectual property law is similar in this
respect. Inventive and creative people are given property rights in order to
allow them to profit from their efforts as a means of promoting these ef-
forts. On the other hand, when inventions and creative works are the result
of accidents, at least in a system designed with efficiency in mind, there is
no need for a property right."
This Article reconsiders this analysis of the disclosure/nondisclosure
issue. Its thesis is that Professor Kronman's analysis, referred to here as the
5 Kronman, supra note 3, at 2, 13.
6 Id. at 13.
7 Id.
8 The principal characteristic of casually acquired information is that it would be obtained wheth-
er or not there was an anticipated return. See id. The examples offered by Professor Kronman range
from an overheard conversation, id., to information that is deliberately acquired and information that
was not obtained in hopes of a future profit, id. at 25. For example, one may do research about one's
home or automobile in order to properly maintain it. See id.
9 Professor Kronman's efficiency-producing nondisclosurer is not necessarily an admirable
character as one is reminded by Roald Dahl's Mr. Cyril Boggis, who cruised the English countryside
looking for undervalued antiques. In the short story "Parson's Pleasure," Mr. Boggis, sometimes dis-
guised as a clergyman, was a masterful negotiator who was able to "become grave and charming for the
aged, obsequious for the rich, sober for the godly, masterful for the weak, mischievous for the widow,
arch and saucy for the spinster." ROALD DAHL, Parson's Pleasure, in TALES OF THE UNEXPECTED 236,
237-38 (1990).
10 Professor Scheppele, in particular, disagrees on whether the common law can be explained by
the deliberate/casual distinction. SCHEPPELE, supra note 4, at 124. Instead, she maintains that a "con-
tractarian theory" is more in accord with the law. Id. Under that theory, information must be disclosed
when the possessor had an advantage in acquiring the information. Id. When the parties have an equal
opportunity, disclosure is not required. Id.
11 When inventions are accidental, the need for internalization and private property is less impor-
tant. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rationalizing the Allocative/Distributive Relationship in Copyright, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 853, 854 (2004) (explaining that in copyright, given the very low level of creativity
required and the protection of aleatory art, it appears that unnecessary property rights are extended).
2010]
GEO. MASON L. REv.
default rule, stops short of a complete analysis in four important ways.
When all these factors are considered, it puts into question the default posi-
tion and suggests that a more nuanced approach is both preferable and poss-
ible. First, in many instances the availability of the information and when it
is available can be intertwined. The deliberate investment may be designed
to enable the provider of the information simply to be first. Yet, very often
being first has little economic impact even though the effort may be expen-
sive. Awarding the first provider of the information the full benefit of the
information advantage is often unnecessary from an economic point of view
and may encourage relatively wasteful efforts. More precisely, a winner-
take-all approach may encourage races in which there is either over- or un-
derinvestment in information-discovering efforts. 2
Second, the foundation of the default rule is that deliberately acquired
information is connected to economic efficiency. In the standard formula-
tion, deliberately acquired information-like the discovery of oil deposits
on farmland or a lost masterpiece at a yard sale-leads to bringing re-
sources into more valued uses. 3 In fact, investments in information have
both allocative and distributive implications. " A policy of not requiring
disclosure of information, even deliberately and expensively acquired in-
formation, if its use has exclusively or predominately distributive effects,
has no socially beneficial consequences. 5 In fact, the converse is true: the
social costs of efforts to acquire information when the purpose is primarily
to have a distributive impact are comparable to those which scholars have
associated with theft6 and monopoly. 7
Third, the default position as generally understood seems to stress only
one type of information. The usual scenario is one in which one person has
12 See infra Part lI.D.
13 The economic theory which seems to underlie Professor Kronman's theory uses wealth max-
imization as its standard. The wealth maximization, or Kaldor-Hicks standard, as opposed to a utilitarian
standard, seeks to allocate resources to those who value them the most as measured by their willingness
and ability to pay. See HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 2, at 28-31.
14 As a general matter "allocative" refers to the eventual use of a resource. Harrison, supra note
11, at 855; see also HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 2, at 22-23. Distributive issues concern how a
set amount of profit or benefit will be divided. Harrison, supra note 11, at 855.
15 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 295. Although this idea is advanced by Cooter and Ulen,
it is not clear what is regarded as "information." Part of the thesis of this Article is that the concept of
information extends to all unilateral efforts that have a perception-affecting effect which, if understood
by the party affected, would influence the terms of the exchange or whether it would be made at all.
16 See infra text accompanying notes 111-14. For the classic article on the social costs of theft, see
Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967). For a
follow-up article describing rent-seeking as a method for understanding social cost and wealth transfers,
see Gordon Tullock, The Origin Rent-Seeking Concept, 2 INT'L J. Bus. & ECON. I, 1 (2003).
17 See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807
(1975) (estimating the social costs of monopoly in the United States based on the assumption that mo-
nopoly profits are converted into social costs through the competition to gain a monopoly and the mo-
nopoly-inducing regulations in the United States).
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invested in information the import of which is that something is more valu-
able than it is thought to be by his or her counterpart. The idea is that the
item has been undervalued and the buyer's investment leads to a proper
valuation and a more efficient use of the resource. There is, however, no
reason a priori to assume that research is predominately directed to the dis-
covery of undervalued items. In fact, "prospect theory," as described by
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky,'" suggests just the opposite. Accord-
ing to Kahneman and Tversky, "[t]he aggravation that one experiences in
losing a sum of money appears to be greater than the pleasure associated
with gaining the same amount."' 9 If acquiring something only to find out
later that it is worth less than expected is viewed as a loss, people are likely
to invest more to avoid losses. This is not to say that this information is not
potentially important. The discovery of overvaluation can, like undervalua-
tion, have important allocative implications. In the instances of overvalua-
tion, however, buyers are anxious to disclose the information to sellers.
Disclosure is assured. The new owner, however, has no motivation to reveal
the information to a subsequent buyer. Consequently, whatever social bene-
fit results from research may be quickly lost or not materialize at all, and
the outcome can ultimately be viewed as having produced distributive, as
opposed to allocative, effects.
Finally, although the casual/deliberate distinction has appeal to it,2" the
theory has not been extended to the point of allowing all potential benefits.
The default rule seems to begin with the notion that a "mistake" has oc-
curred and then proceeds to ask, using the casual/deliberate analysis,
whether the disadvantaged party should be permitted to rescind if the other
party had control of information that would have corrected the mistake.
This first step--whether there was mistake-is somewhat artificial. Indeed,
terms like "mistake" and "unilateral mistake"'" are terms of art typically
invoked once a decision has been made. For the casual/deliberate distinc-
tion to realize its full economic potential, the appropriate initial question
should be whether one party has withheld any perception-affecting informa-
tion that would substantially change the terms under which another party
18 See Daniel Kahncman & Amos Tvcrsky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,
47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 274 (1979). See generally Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference,
and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115, 1116-17 (2003) (explaining prospect theory, analyzing its use in
the legal field, and concluding that the theory is a valuable tool in analyzing legal issues); John A. List,
Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace, 72 ECONOMETRICA 615,
616 (2004) (examining prospect theory and the endowment effect through a field experiment and reach-
ing the conclusion that prospect theory is consistent with the behavior of inexperienced consumers).
19 Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 18, at 279.
20 This is particularly true when "casual" is defined, as Professor Kronman does, to include inci-
dentally acquired information. See Kronman, supra note 3, at 13.
21 "Defect," "patent," and "latent" are terms of art as well.
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would agree to enter into a bargain. 2 Arguably, if the answer is yes, it is at
that point the casual/deliberate distinction comes into play. One could reph-
rase this by saying: when should nondisclosure of any information be
viewed as leading to an excusable mistake by the other party? 23 This would
be more consistent with the compromise Professor Kronman seems to have
sought in proposing the default position. When that approach is used, how-
ever, the range of permissible nondisclosure shrinks relative to the range of
required disclosure to the extent that the benefits of the default rule itself
may be outweighed by its social costs.
The sum of these factors is that the default rule and its allowance of
nondisclosure create a set of incentives that are the source of social costs. In
addition, it permits nondisclosure in instances where there is no welfare-
increasing rationale. Part I of this Article elaborates on the basic model and
some of the complexities of identifying the actual impact of nondisclosure.
Part II details the social costs of the default nondisclosure rule. In this con-
text, the costs are largely one of overinvestment. In other words, the non-
disclosure rule creates a set of investment incentives that are inconsistent
with efficient outcomes. In Part III, a case is made that concepts like "mis-
take" and "defect," both "patent" and "latent," unnecessarily retard alloca-
tive efficiency by limiting what must be disclosed. In Part IV, alternatives
to the default nondisclosure rule are examined in the context of several cas-
es, some of which have been used to illustrate the virtues of the default rule.
These alternatives are two versions of a Golden Rule of disclosure. Under a
full-disclosure rule, no information may be concealed that would be rele-
vant to the decision-making of the opposite party. Under a "cost-
minimizing" approach, nondisclosure would be permitted but only when
social benefits are advanced. 4
I. THE BASIC MODEL
The basic nondisclosure issue can be illustrated with two examples in-
volving yard sale transactions. In the first, a party studies older audio
22 This includes, of course, the possibility that disclosure would mean there arc no terms under
which the contract would be made.
23 See discussion infra Part Ill. For example, an airline might regard it as ill-advised to disclose
the age of its fleet. This would likely not be regarded as a mistake and thus not reach the ca-
sual/deliberate analysis. Still, the information is likely to be perception-affecting and casually acquired.
See infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
24 The two alternatives also are consistent with different approaches to risk. They mirror to some
extent the debate about the preferences of individuals behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. Ultimately,
the decision depends on how risk averse the parties are. The "cost minimizing" approach is similar to
Rawls' "difference principle." See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75-78 (1971) (explaining the
difference principle as the idea that "the social order is not to establish and secure the more attractive
prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage of those less fortunate").
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equipment that is still favored by audiophiles. She then makes a Saturday
morning tour of yard sales looking for specific models of audio equipment.
She buys the components for yard sale prices and resells at much higher
prices. The profit is a return to the investment made in learning about stereo
equipment. If disclosure were required, the likelihood that the information
will be gathered decreases, and the chances that valued stereo equipment
will find its way to a landfill or to someone who does not appreciate its
quality increases. Put in slightly more technical terms, the system promotes
allocative efficiency in that components are more likely to find their way to
people who value them the most. 5 In effect, the research has resulted in a
market correction. The seller of the equipment will, of course, claim that a
mistake has occurred, but the social cost of responding to that claim is that
various resources will remain misallocated.
An example of this type of reasoning is Neill v. Shamburg,26 in which
one co-tenant purchased the rights to land of another co-tenant.2 7 The land
had undergone limited development and included one marginally produc-
tive oil well. 8 Wells on neighboring land were found to be significantly
productive.29 The buying co-tenant knew this and instructed those who had
contact with the selling co-tenant not to reveal the information to her.3" In
ruling that the buyer had no obligation to disclose, the court noted that the
defendant had invested substantial sums and reasoned that, "[w]e do not
find in the acts of Shamburg, under the circumstances, anything more than a
positive intention and effort to reap the benefit of his enterprise, by keeping
the knowledge of its results to himself."'"
25 By implication this is an application of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See supra note 13. For the
original articles establishing the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency theory, see JR. Hicks, The Foundations of
Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696, 711 (1939); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics
and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 550 (1939).
26 27 A. 992 (Pa. 1893).
27 Id. at 993.
28 See id. at 992.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 993.
31 Id. Professor Kronman uses Neill v. Shamburg as an example of the right not to disclose delibe-
rately acquired information. Kronman, supra note 3, at 19-20. According to Professor Kronman and as
implied by the opinion, Shamburg appears to have owned the neighboring land that included the produc-
ing well. Kronman, supra note 3, at 19; see also Shamburg, 27 A. at 992. If this is the case, it is not
clear that the case fits Professor Kronman's deliberate/casual distinction. Whatever research conducted
about the oil-producing potential of the land seems to have been called forth by his interest in the land
he already owned. Whatever information it produced about the neighboring land of which he was a co-
tenant seems to be casually or incidentally obtained. Put differently, there is no evidence that Shamburg
invested more on developing his tract of land because he was a co-tenant of the neighboring tract. Even
if the case does fit Professor Kronman's theory, it is not clear that the deliberate/casual distinction is the
only factor playing a role. The language of the case is difficult to understand but one interpretation is
that the price for the land included a provision for payments depending on whether oil was produced on
the land. See Shamburg, 27 A. at 993 (stating that the parties' agreement had a clause "stipulating a
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In the second example, the yard sale shopper knows very little about
stereos. Just before going shopping, however, he stops at a friend's house
where the friend has music playing. The friend says, "I just bought that
1972 Nakamichi 890 tube receiver for only $500 on eBay."32 A few minutes
later, while looking for fishing equipment, the shopper spots the same re-
ceiver at a yard sale for $20 and buys it. Under the deliberate/casual distinc-
tion, the buyer would have to disclose this information to the seller. This
has no impact on the gathering of information in the future because it was
acquired without the sort of effort for which one expects to be compen-
sated. Note also that disclosing the information, once it has been acquired,
has no impact on the eventual use of the stereo. If the information is dis-
closed, the seller realizes that the component should be spared from the
trash heap just as if the buyer had purchased it.33 Here, according to Profes-
sor Kronman, the common law is likely to view the mistake as significant
enough to warrant rescission.34
The distinction made by Professor Kronman makes sense as a first
take on the matter but leaves out a great deal. The incompleteness can be
understood in the context of the case most frequently used to illustrate the
nondisclosure problem, Laidlaw v. Organ.35 The case involved the purchase
of tobacco at the end of the War of 1812.36 The end of the war meant the
end of a blockade and thus, an increase in the price of tobacco. 7 Organ re-
ceived the news earlier than others and bought tobacco from Laidlaw at an
especially favorable price.38 The news was evidently distributed more
'further consideration of one hundred dollars when a well is found on said lease producing six barrels
per day"'). In other words, the seller evidently understood that oil production was possible but just did
not understand the proximity of successful production.
32 The example is hypothetical. Your author is not an audiophile, but Nakamichi sounds familiar.
For the Nakamichi home page, see http://www.nakamichi.com/home.html.
33 This is not to say there should be no reward for the process of buying and reselling, but that is a
different matter from an investment in information. Moreover, as Professor Kronman notes, the delibe-
rately/casually acquired distinction is more of a continuum than a dichotomy. Kronman, supra note 3, at
14.
34 Although Professor Kronman uses the overheard conversation as one example of casually
acquired information, id. at 13, the more likely occasions arc those in which the information is delibe-
rately acquired but not with an eye toward future exploitation, see id. at 25.
35 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
36 See id. at 178, 182-83. For other discussions of Laidlaw v. Organ, see COOTER & ULEN, supra
note 2, at 294; Kronman, supra note 3, at 10.
37 See Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 182-83; see also Kronman, supra note 3, at 10.
38 See Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 183 (explaining that upon the news being disseminated "the
value of said article had risen from 30 to 50 per cent"). Interestingly, the representative making the sale
"asked if there was any news which was calculated to enhance the price or value of the article about to
be purchased." Id. Perhaps pre-dawn Sunday tobacco purchases in 1815 were a bit unusual and the odd
nature of this sale may have been enough to put the representative on notice. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 49-50.
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broadly the same day.39 The Supreme Court held that there was no duty for
Organ to inform Laidlaw of the news.'
From an economic perspective, the outcome can be defended as con-
sistent with the timely dissemination of information. In very basic terms, if
the price of tobacco goes up it means it is a more valued commodity. In
order to meet this demand and presumably to enhance the utility of tobacco
users, it is important that the increased value be communicated to the mar-
ket more generally and specifically to tobacco growers. This promotes al-
locative efficiency. As Professor Kronman notes, "[i]nformation revealing a
change in circumstances which alters the relative value of a particular
commodity will always have some (perhaps unmeasurable) allocative im-
pact."4 1 Requiring disclosure, so the argument goes, would remove the in-
centive to bring information to the market. In short, the nondisclosure rule
rests on the assumption that the potential provider of the information must
be permitted to internalize the benefit of the information.
The history of Laidlaw v. Organ evidently does not reveal how Organ
came to be in possession of the news from which he was eventually to prof-
it.4" Nevertheless, the fact pattern illustrates more than Professor Kronman
originally suggested. For example, in the context of the case, Organ beat the
public dissemination by a very short period of time.43 In effect, in terms of
allocative effects, the one hour or so jump he had on others made virtually
no difference with respect to tobacco crops and allocative efficiency. This
illustrates the possibility that in some instances the notion of deliberate ef-
fort is more connected with speed than with the information itself. Unless
an award for being first is warranted by the allocative consequences, the
deliberate/casual distinction loses its appeal as an indicator of what sorts of
efforts should be rewarded.
For example, the effort may simply duplicate the efforts of others. In
addition, the first disseminator of the information may not be the lowest
cost provider of the information; other providers may experience economies
of scale in gathering information or disseminate it to a broader audience.
Or, the second provider may be someone who comes across the information
casually. Finally, at least from an allocative perspective, rewarding the in-
formation provider any amount in excess of the minimum necessary to
39 See Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 183.
40 Id. at 195.
41 Kronman, supra note 3, at 12.
42 Id. at 15 ("It is unclear, from the report of the case, whether the buyer in Laidlaw casually
acquired his information or made a deliberate investment in seeking it out ...."). The opinion tells us
that, on the night before the purchase, three men brought news of the peace treaty from the British fleet.
Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 182-83. Although difficult to decipher, it seems that the brother of one of
the three men was entitled to one-third of the profits from the purchase, and this was the connection
through which Organ received the information. Id. at 183.
43 Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 183 (stating that the information was made public in a handbill
on Sunday morning at 8:00, but the purchase was made "soon after sunrise" that morning).
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make the investment worthwhile is unnecessary. As Laidlaw v. Organ
seems to illustrate, there is nothing automatically magical, as an economic
matter, about the first provider, and an efficient approach to the disclo-
sure/nondisclosure dilemma requires a more nuanced examination of the
social value of the effort and the information provided.
Perhaps more important in examining the default model are the uses to
which deliberately acquired information may be put. There is no reason to
think deliberately acquired information is any more likely to promote alloc-
ative ends than to promote distributive ones. Suppose in Laidlaw v. Organ,
Organ had invested significant resources into tracking the course of the war
knowing that various commodities would demand a higher price once the
war ended. He also knew that the news would be quickly disseminated to
New Orleans merchants who would raise their prices just as Laidlaw un-
doubtedly would have as soon as he saw or heard about the handbill that
was to come shortly. It is hard to see Organ's investment as being designed
to do anything more than to redistribute wealth from Laidlaw to himself."
Put differently, even if acquired deliberately, Organ's information likely
had no allocative importance.
One premise of those supporting the default rule must be that without
it, investments in acquiring information would fail. This, in itself, is not
obvious. There are two points to be considered here. First, a great deal of
information resulting from investment is readily revealed because it indi-
cates that something has been overvalued by the seller. 5 And, as noted ear-
lier, this type of information may be more commonly acquired than infor-
mation revealing positive outcomes.46 Consequently, the default rule plays
no role in increasing this type of investment.
The second general point is that any investment is largely contingent
on a belief that one has a property right in the information. Just how much
is invested in this particular "property right" can be understood by consider-
ing copyright and patent law. In those instances, the possessors of the
"property" are permitted to keep it.47 On the other hand, suppose a copy-
right or patent holder were required to provide licenses at no cost to all who
ask. To be sure, there would be substantially less invested in authorship and
innovation. In these instances, one could say that the property right is very
"thin."
Thin is an apt way to characterize the common law protection of unila-
terally held information. The common law goes no further than to say that
44 Professors Cooter and Ulen also question whether the decision in Laidlaw v. Organ is consis-
tent with efficiency goals. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 294.
45 See infra Part II.C.
46 See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
47 This is subject to various statutory exceptions, the primary one of which relates to "fair use" in
the context of copyright law. FRANK H. FOSTER & ROBERT L. SHOOK, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS &
TRADEMARKS 149 (1989).
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in some instances there is no duty to disclose. On the other hand, the pos-
sessor of the information is, by and large, required to reveal it if asked. For
example, the art expert at the yard sale who spots the Picasso may be asked
by the seller, "do you know anything about this painting?" The buyer is
trapped. If he says "no," he has engaged in a misrepresentation.48 One might
advise the buyer to say nothing, but even that is an answer of sorts and is
likely to put the seller on notice.49 Thus, if asked for the information he ei-
ther lies, which would make the contract likely avoidable, or he ignores the
question, which is likely to make the seller suspicious enough to withdraw
the painting from the sale." No doubt some of the risk of being asked to
reveal may be reduced by strategic behavior (e.g., appearing disinterested
or offering a very low price that suggests that you know nothing). But the
question remains of how much serious investing takes place in a property
right to information that is free to anyone who asks for it. To some extent it
is more accurate to say that people have a "right," if it can be called that,
simply because of the ignorance of others. It would be tantamount to having
an exclusive "right" to the use of one's land unless someone else asks to use
it. Put differently, whatever value the information has to the one possessing
it and the level of the investment one might make seem largely contingent
on a misunderstanding of the law.
II. THE SOCIAL COSTS OF THE NONDISCLOSURE RULE
This Article suggests that there are categories beyond casual and deli-
berate and that recognizing them and responding appropriately can reduce
social costs. First, however, it is useful to take a quick look at casually ac-
quired information. While it may not make sense to reward instances of
nondisclosure of casually acquired information, this gives rise to another
question: why require disclosure of casually acquired information?5 If it is
true that disclosure often does not result in any allocative losses, why not
treat the information as a windfall and let the gains and losses fall where
48 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981) ("A person's non-disclosure of a
fact known to him is equivalent to an assertion that the fact does not exist .. where he knows that
disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake of the other party as to a basic assumption on which that
party is making the contract and if non-disclosure of the fact amounts to a failure to act in good faith and
in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.").
49 Professor Kronman notes that even a refusal to answer could amount to fraud. Kronman, supra
note 3, at 10 n.27 (stating that "in light of Laidlaw's direct question," Organ's silence may have been
fraudulent).
50 Interestingly, there may be a market solution to this quandary. Sellers could compete on the
basis of how few questions they ask prospective buyers.
51 The question becomes more interesting when one considers that information is likely to be, as
Professor Kronman points out, somewhere on a continuum between casually and deliberately acquired.
Kronman, supra note 3, at 14.
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they may? The problem is that actions based on incorrect or incomplete
information--often labeled mistakes--do result in misallocations. The be-
lief, for example, that one is buying a defect-free house only to find that it
is termite-ridden means that the same money could have been allocated to
achieve greater satisfaction elsewhere.5 2 Perhaps more importantly; one of
the attractive features of contracting is that it has the potential to make both
parties better off. Unless one or more individuals are made worse off, these
exchanges are Pareto superior moves and welfare increasing.53 On the other
hand, if the exchange is based on a false or mistaken impression, the out-
come is not Pareto superior and may or may not increase overall welfare."
If mistake and consequent losses can be avoided at a small cost, it makes
sense to require disclosure.
With this aside, it is time to focus on deliberately acquired informa-
tion. There are a number of reasons why the nondisclosure rule is less at-
tractive and more costly than it may initially seem. To understand why, it is
important to adopt a purely functional view of Professor Kronman's distinc-
tion. The function is to permit nondisclosure when it is socially beneficial.
Taking this function seriously means asking a number of additional ques-
tions. First, the general question should be framed not in terms of delibe-
rately or casually acquired, but in terms of whether required disclosure of
information-however acquired-would actually generate less allocatively
relevant information in the future. A second question is whether the party
acquiring the information is either the only provider of the information or at
least the lowest cost provider. Finally, was the information acquired for the
use to which it was actually applied?55 As the following suggests, there are
a number of instances in which nondisclosure, even of deliberately acquired
information, imposes significant social costs and makes little economic
sense.
A. Proximate Cause
A functional approach to the disclosure/nondisclosure problem is one
that permits nondisclosure when there is a connection between the nondis-
52 Professor Kronman seems to offer a slightly different rationale for avoiding mistakes. A risk of
mistake, he writes, "is a cost to the contracting parties themselves and to society as a whole since the
actual occurrence of a mistake always (potentially) increases the resources which must be devoted to the
process of allocating goods to their highest-valued users." Id. at 2-3.
53 An outcome is Pareto superior if the result is that at least one party is better off and no one is
made worse off. See supra note 2.
54 An outcome that is not Pareto superior may still increase overall welfare if those benefiting
receive more than those made worse off lose. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 47.
55 As will be explained, unless there is some cognitive connection between acquisition of the
information and the profit, allowing possessors of the information to retain the profit has no functional
effect. See infra Part ii.A.
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closure and future benefits. Proximate cause, special damages, and fore-
seeability, terms usually associated with losses in the context of a tort or a
breach of contract, are all applicable in this context. A logical approach to
the proximity issue is to ask the question: will holding the party liable have
any impact on future conduct? This theme can be perceived in law school
standards ranging from Hadley v. Baxendale56 to Transatlantic Financing
Corp. v. United States.7 Another way to state the question is whether the
chain of events-say, in a torts case--or the type of damages suffered in a
contracts case are so improbable that, even if a party knew of the possible
liability, there would be no impact on conduct. 8
There is very little reason not to apply the same analysis to gains.
Gains to a party that are not proximately caused by prior decisions59 are
sufficiently disconnected that awarding them will not affect conduct. Con-
sequently, in the context of information, it makes little sense to reward one
for the acquisition of information if the process of acquisition was not mo-
tivated, at least at some level, by the promise of the reward.
One can understand this disconnectedness by thinking about a college
art major who discovers a misplaced masterpiece at a yard sale. The delibe-
rately acquired information does lead to the discovery, but the possibility of
finding yard sale masterpieces hardly led to the decision to acquire the in-
formation-a degree in art-possibly years earlier. In short, the gain is not
proximately related to the deliberate acquisition of information. Not only is
the gain unanticipated, but, even if it is, the present value of the gain at the
time of making the investment decision could be tiny.6" More importantly, it
is unlikely the number of people studying art will decline if the occasional
yard sale finding is not rewarded.6 What this means is that the ca-
sual/deliberate division does not capture the distinction between efficient
and inefficient nondisclosure. In fact, it would be more efficient to treat
some deliberately acquired information as though it were casually acquired.
Otherwise, the social cost of a mistake is incurred without any offsetting
gain.
56 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
57 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
58 Obviously, in thc case in which the possibility of liability is unknown, there will be no impact
on conduct.
59 In this context, proximately caused means that the party planned on or anticipated the gain at
the time the decision was made to incur the costs associated with gathering the relevant information.
60 In the context of copyright, this point can be understood by asking if an extra ten years added to
the current copyright term of life plus seventy years is likely to encourage more creative efforts. See
infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
61 The outcome would be and should be different if a person set out to study art in the belief that
there were misplaced treasures. This would be more akin to those who search for buried treasure.
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B. Information and Sunk Gains
The reasoning with respect to proximate cause is related to that applied
to sunk gains. To help understand this relation, first think about sunk costs.
A sunk cost is a cost that, for purposes of rational decision-making, is irre-
levant.6" A common example is the person who reasons he must go to a
concert, football game, or a weekend trip, because the tickets are already
purchased. The problem is that nothing about the decision means recover-
ing those costs-in this case, the price of the tickets. The relevant factors
are those at the margin, meaning the future costs and benefits affected by
the decision.
The notion of sunk gains refers to the same type of irrelevancy. Take,
for example, the idea of playing poker with "house money." The existence
of house money does not alter the probability of winning or losing on the
next hand. For example, in the context of blackjack, one does not take a
"hit" while sitting on twenty because he or she won the prior hand.
A relatively recent copyright case illustrates the sunk gains issue. El-
dred v. Ashcroft3 was a review of the Copyright Term Extension Act of
1998, which extended the copyright term for most works from life plus fifty
years to life plus seventy years. 64 The extension was retroactive. 65 One ar-
gument for not permitting the retroactive extension (couched in constitu-
tional terms) was that the extension could not "promote the Progress of
Science, 66 at least with respect to work already in existence. The Court
rejected this argument by envisioning a bargain-like relationship between
authors and the public under which authors assumed, when producing
works, even fifty years ago or more, that they would have the benefits of
any future term extensions.67
The notion that an author in, say 1930, was, even at the margin, moti-
vated by some future lengthening of the copyright term seems farfetched.
The gains some time far in the future would have to be discounted both to
present value and discounted further for the possibility they may never oc-
cur.68 It would be like saying that an author today is more productive be-
62 RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, ECONOMICS FOR LAWYERS 115-16 (2005).
63 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
64 Id. at 193. The Copyright Term Extension Act amended 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304, enlarging the
term by twenty years. ld
65 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193 ("Congress provided for application of the enlarged terms to existing
and future copyrights alike.").
66 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries").
67 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 214-15.
68 Justice Breyer's opinion in dissent outlines the economic objections to the extension. See id. at
248-53 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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cause of the likelihood, likely to be unknown to the author, that in 2060 the
copyright term may be extended from life plus seventy years to life plus
ninety years. Whatever social benefits result from past creativity can be
seen as sunk gains. Allowing the copyright holder to internalize those gains
quite literally cannot affect decision-making that has already occurred.
Copyright and patent law both deal with information that is deliberate-
ly acquired. Whatever works were created under prior copyright terms are
now sunk gains. Disclosure in the case of patents or free access in the case
of copyright are not required for a limited period of time in order to encour-
age not past, but future efforts. In fact, putting constitutional issues aside, a
decision today that all pre-1950 works are in the public domain would only
be relevant to the extent it affects future works. Works in existence are, in
effect, house money.
The same is true with respect to whatever allocative gains may flow
from previously acquired information. In this regard, it is important to note
that every case that reaches a court in which disclosure is an issue is ulti-
mately a battle between two parties over sunk gains. The research to ac-
quire the information deliberately has already taken place. Consequently,
any decision a current court makes, while hugely important to the parties
involved, has no positive implication unless it affects future efficient infor-
mation gathering efforts.69 For example, again recalling the case of the art
major who uncovers the masterpiece," the gains from that person's invest-
ment and others similarly situated are sunk. No decision today can increase
or decrease those gains, and, insofar as the two parties, the decision has
only distributive consequences.
An obvious question is how to separate cases in which only sunk gains
and distributive issues are involved from those that have future-looking
implications. As already suggested, perhaps the best example of instances
in which information and the positive allocative consequences should be
treated as sunk gains are those in which proximate cause is weak.7 It is
important to note that the question is not whether a person's actions have
socially beneficial results but whether a decision to reward current actions
will increase the likelihood of socially beneficial actions in the future. Con-
sequently, one can combine the idea of proximate cause and sunk gains and
narrow the scope of permitted nondisclosure to those cases in which the
information was deliberately gathered and the use to which it was put was
foreseeable by the party not disclosing it.
69 Deliberately acquired information can be acquired inefficiently, so the question to be consi-
dered is whether these efforts should be encouraged. See infra Part lI.D.
70 See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
71 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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C. The Nondisclosure of Negative Information
One version of the nondisclosure issue arises when a party recognizes
that an item has been undervalued. Less frequently discussed are instances
in which the deliberately acquired information reveals that a seller has
overvalued an item. This emphasis is likely to be misplaced if prospect
theory is a factor. As explained earlier, a baseline teaching of prospect
theory is that people attach more disutility to losses than utility to gains of
the same magnitude.72 As an example, a wrong decision that results in buy-
ing a supposedly valuable painting that is in fact worthless is more likely to
be avoided than a wrong decision not to buy a painting that turns out to be
more valuable than expected. This means that investments are more likely
to be made in order to avoid losses than to discover treasures.
A number of implications flow from investments in value-reducing in-
formation. As an initial matter, it is important to note that the information
does have economic significance. It is as useful economically to reveal a
fraud, forgery, or skeletons in the closet as it is to uncover a lost treasure.
Both effects are potentially market-correcting.73 Beyond that, however, im-
portant differences emerge. First, the idea that it makes sense to incur social
costs in order to encourage investments in information has no application
here. While the party who discovers the undervalued item is reluctant to
share the information with the seller, the party who finds information indi-
cating that an item is overvalued is all too anxious to share the news with
the seller. The market, not the law, takes care of the disclosure issue, at
least at this point. This means that any argument that costs and benefits are
to be weighed against each other when assessing the nondisclosure rule is
irrelevant in the context of negative information. There is no need to offer
nondisclosure as a quid pro quo for the information gathering effort since
the private benefit of the research exercise hinges on revealing it.
There is, however, another wrinkle in the analysis. The party who dis-
covers the misplaced masterpiece at a yard sale resells it to those who rec-
ognize its value. It is by revealing its worth and then selling the masterpiece
that the party internalizes the benefits of the investment in information. The
pattern is generally nondisclosure in the initial transaction, followed by full
disclosure thereafter. Nondisclosure, ironically, does lead to full and per-
manent disclosure, just not at the time of the initial transaction. The pattern
is likely to be reversed when the item is overvalued. The party discloses the
information in the initial transaction but has no incentive to do so upon re-
sale. In fact, in this case internalization results from nondisclosure-by
buying low while the rest of the world, so to speak, believes in the original
72 See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
73 This is not to say that both types of information are used in an equally effective way to actually
correct the market.
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and mistaken higher value. In the worst case, the information is buried until
the research is redone. In effect, private profits are increased by keeping
information from becoming known more broadly. This means that not dis-
closing negative information, whether casually or deliberately acquired, is
unlikely to have a socially beneficial, market-correcting effect.74
There is some similarity between this idea and that of sunk gains. By
adjusting the price of the overvalued item to its proper value, the buyer and
possessor of negative information has internalized the benefits of the in-
vestment because, without the investment, the price paid would have been
higher. In many instances, this investment would have been made whether
or not a subsequent resale was anticipated. If profit from the resale were not
anticipated, the information represents a sunk gain. If another transaction
were anticipated, the gain may not be sunk, but whatever additional private
gain results has no connection to a socially beneficial outcome.
To be sure, contract law-both statutory and common-to a limited
degree, prevents one from profiting from the nondisclosure of negative in-
formation. As Dean Alex Johnson has pointed out, especially in the context
of real property, sellers often have a number of disclosure obligations.75 In
addition, under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, nondisclosure can
be treated as a misrepresentation under certain conditions.76 To some extent
this prohibition on nondisclosure may actually curtail some types of re-
search into negative information since it prevents the investing party from
internalizing the gain that is only available if the information remains se-
cret.77
D. Information Races
Economists, especially those specializing in industrial organization,
have written extensively about patent races.78 The basic idea is that several
74 The use of information for distributive purposes is discussed below. See discussion infra
Part II.E.
75 Johnson, supra note 4, at 100-16 (covering the history of the caveat emptor doctrine as it relates
to real property sales, including formulation, erosion, and the modem laws creating a lighter version of
the doctrine by only requiring certain disclosures when selling a home).
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981). The Restatement makes no distinction
between information that is casually or deliberately obtained. According to Professor Kronman, the
illustrations found in the Restatements of Contract and Torts can be reconciled with the deliberate/casual
distinction. See Kronman, supra note 3, at 28-32.
77 For example, a homeowner in anticipation of selling his or her house may elect not to have an
inspection that would reveal information that would have to be disclosed.
78 See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
532-40 (3d ed. 2000); JEFFREY CHURCH & ROGER WARE, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: A STRATEGIC
APPROACH 582-88 (2000); Jennifer F. Reinganum, The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development,
and Diffusion, in I HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 849 (Richard Scbmalensec & Robert D.
Willig eds., 5th ed. 1998); Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926 (2000).
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firms may engage in research to acquire a profitable patent. Only one can
be successful. The efforts of those who do not prevail are essentially social
costs. Put differently, the winner-take-all character of the patent (or any
information) race produces social costs.
Patent race theories play out in different ways depending on the infor-
mation competitors possess and their tolerance of risk. One simple example
is that while there may be private benefits to being first due to the winner-
take-all element of patents, the social benefits of an invention occurring
today versus six months or a year from now may be negligible.79 In effect,
the parties battle about a particular profit that will not vary much with the
timing of the invention. The timing is critical, however, and the rivalry it-
self results in excessive and duplicative research and development expendi-
tures.8 0
The risk of overinvestment would seem to be decreased if only one
firm were selected to do the research. A type of bidding would take place
with the winning bidder being the firm that could complete the race first."
Of course, each firm estimates the cost of finishing first, and the winning
firm may be the firm most willing to invest the most in research and devel-
opment. In fact, in an extension of this model, it is profitable to spend addi-
tional funds to be first up to the total amount of profit that is derived by
being first.8 2 Only one firm will invest and there will be no losses associated
with the losing firm. 3 The problem is that the winning firm will be required
to invest an amount equal to the expected profit. Rather than invest at the
socially optimal level where the marginal costs of research and develop-
ment are equal to the marginal benefit, the firm will invest up to all the po-
tential profit in an effort to be first.8 4
The literature on patent races can be quite complicated, but the basic
ideas are intuitive. On one hand, patent races create a risk of overinvest-
ment."5 Those who lose the race, so the theory goes, have wasted their ef-
forts. On the other hand, firms that are relatively risk averse may assume
79 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 135-36.
80 See id. The social costs here are similar to those found in any case of monopoly. See discussion
infra Part II.E.4.
81 CHURCH & WARE, supra note 78, at 584.
82 See id. ("[T]he expenditure on R&D will be bid up ... to the point at which the winning firm
will expect its revenues under the patent to be exactly equal to the costs of doing the research; i.e., the
present value of its profits will be zero.").
8' See id.
84 See id. at 585-86. In yet another variation, firms in a race may find themselves in a prisoner's
dilemma type situation. Id. at 586. Suppose there were two firms engaged in research that will lead to a
valuable patent. The project is expected to take two years with one firm or the other claiming that patent.
Another approach to the research is that the expected time of completion is two and a half years but
includes some probability that it will be complete in only one year. Both firms will be tempted to take
the relatively inefficient route even though the expected time of completion is actually longer. See id.
85 See id. at 584.
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they are unlikely to win the race and abandon their efforts even though, in
fact, they may be the more efficient innovators.86 If enough firms do this
there can be an underinvestment.
Obviously, the possession of information can be the result of a race. In
fact, it is hard to imagine a unilateral mistake case in which there is not a
race-like quality--every possessor of information that a counterpart does
not have is likely to be concerned that the information may become evident
to his or her counterpart if enough time passes. What better case to illustrate
this than Laidlaw v. Organ?87 The information that Organ used was in fact
designed to beat the more general dissemination of the same information. In
fact, there were at least two sources of information about the war ending,
and the possessors of this information may have made significant invest-
ments in order to acquire it quickly. The winner-take-all approach in all
likelihood meant excessive investment. Laidlaw v. Organ is a particularly
good case for illustrating this point because it appears that the second pos-
sessor of the information was the government, which acquired the informa-
tion casually in that it made no investment beyond what it was already
committed to spend in waging the war.88
Similarly, the information race scenario seems to fit the nondisclosure
classic Neill v. Shamburg.89 There, Shamburg instructed employees not to
discuss with the seller of the land the fact that a neighboring tract of land
had become productive.9° In effect, Shamburg had the information first-
perhaps as a result of a deliberate effort-and sought to make sure it was
not obtained casually by the seller. More importantly, it appears that the
information was there for the taking because it was simply that an oil well
on a neighboring property was profitable.9' Timing, again, was the key.
The reference to under- or overinvestment in patent races focuses on
duplicative efforts and strategic decisions about whether to continue those
efforts. There is, however, another perspective. Suppose two parties race,
but the less efficient party wins. That is, the same discovery could have
been made with only a slight delay by a researcher that expends far less on
the activity. A policy that awards inefficient winners also involves losses.
86 See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 78, at 540 ("A finn with a relatively short head start can
discourage its rivals from entering a patent race. A trailing finn with no chance of catching up should
drop out of the race immediately."); CHURCH & WARE, supra note 78, at 585 ("In reality, risk and
uncertainty are among the most important features of the innovation activity. History is replete with
examples of finns embarking on major research programs and failing in the attempt, or at least failing to
be first.").
87 The facts of the case are discussed above. See supra notes 35-40, 42-43 and accompanying text.
88 "Casual" in this context refers to Professor Kronman's notion that "casual" refers to instances
in which the information was generated as an incidental result of another deliberate effort. See supra
text accompanying notes 4-8.
89 The facts of the case arc discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 26-3 1.
90 Neill v. Shamburg, 27 A. 992, 993 (Pa. 1893).
9' Id. at 992.
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The comparison is like that of allocative and productive efficiency. Patent
races can be regarded as allocatively inefficient because too many resources
are drawn into the production of a particular innovation.92 On the other
hand, even in the absence of this loss, if the producer of the innovation is
not the lowest cost producer, the outcome is akin to productive inefficien-
cy.93 Again, Laidlaw v. Organ comes into play. Whatever investment Organ
made in discovering that the war had ended was more than that incurred by
the government, which "discovered" the information in what amounted at
no cost at all.94 Thus, the problem is not simply that there are two invest-
ments, but that the less efficient winner may win.
E. Information Acquired Deliberately for Distributive Purposes
1. The Theory and the Simple Case
The consideration of deliberately acquiring information primarily to
achieve distributive ends is hardly new. As students of contract law and
economists know, and as Paul Samuelson pointed out years ago, "rational
self-interest . . . does not necessitate that there will emerge ... a Pareto-
optimal solution that maximizes.., profits, in advance of and without re-
92 Allocative efficiency is concerned with allocating resources into their most valuable use. Brod-
ley, supra note 2, at 1025, 1027.
93 Productive efficiency, on the other hand, is largely about producing a level of output at the
lowest per unit cost. Id.
94 Again it is instructive to take a close look at Neill v. Shamburg. It is Professor Kronman's
assertion that the buyer, Shamberg, owned the neighboring tract of land. Kronman, supra note 3, at 19.
It seems that this is the case, but the opinion does not so state. See Neill, 27 A. at 992-93. Again it is
useful to look closely at the reasoning of the court:
[U]nlcss there is some exceptional circumstance to put on him the duty to speak, it is the
right of every man to keep his business to himself. Possibly, Shamburg was unduly suspi-
cious on this point, but the nature and position of his business suggested caution. Fogle testi-
fies that Shamburg was the only person operating in that neighborhood, and James says that
Shamburg told him he had spent near $150,000 in developing that territory, "and now all
these fellows are anxious to pry into my business." We do not find in the acts of Shamburg,
under the circumstances, anything more than a positive intention and effort to reap the bene-
fit of his enterprise, by keeping the knowledge of its results to himself, and we agree with the
master that this "falls far short of establishing fraud."
Id. at 993. Assuming, as Professor Kronman does, that Shamberg owned the land, there is no evidence
that he incurred greater expense on his tract of land because he was a co-tenant of neighboring land. As
noted earlier, this may render the information casually obtained. See supra notes 7-8, 31 and accompa-
nying text.
It seems likely that the plaintiff, Neill, or some subsequent owner would discover oil on the
jointly owned tract. The relevant question would be whether that discovery could be made at a lower
cost than that incurred by Shamburg. If so, the cost saved on the discovery would have to be compared
with the benefit, if any, of the earlier discovery. In short, Shamburg's superior timing may have little to
do with ultimately advancing allocative goals.
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gard to how that maximized profit is to be divided up."95 In effect, every
contract involves a gain from the exchange and a subsidiary agreement on
how that gain is to be divided. The rationally self-interested person can be
interested in both or focus on the subsidiary agreement.96 Deliberately ob-
tained information can be profitably devoted to maximizing one's share of
the "gain" whether or not there is any particular allocative advance. Efforts
to profit without an accompanying positive impact on efficiency are labeled
"rent seeking" by economists.97
The logic behind different treatment of information that leads to alloc-
ative consequences as opposed to distributive consequences can be unders-
tood with a simple example. Suppose the seller of a car is willing to accept
no less than $5,000 for the car and the buyer, after inspecting it closely,
decides he would be willing to pay any price less than $6,000. Two things
are important here: first, it is allocatively efficient for the car to be sold-it
has more value to the buyer than the seller. Second, any price between
$5,000 and $6,000 would make both parties better off. In effect, prices be-
tween $5,000 and $6,000 compose what economists call a contract curve.98
The allocative question is whether there is a contract curve at all. In other
words, is there any way to potentially make at least one party better off
without negatively affecting the other party?9 9 Any point on the contract
curve serves the allocative end. In fact, it could be picked arbitrarily and the
very same level of efficiency would be achieved. The distributive question
is the actual price. Any information costs associated with the haggling and
bargaining over a specific point on the contract curve can be viewed as a
social cost-resources are consumed without an advance in overall wealth.
As each party bargains for more than the least he would take and the other
bargains for a price lower than the most he would be willing to pay, they
are both involved in rent-seeking."°
95 PAUL A. SAMUELSON, The Monopolistic Competition Revolution, in 3 THE COLLECTED
SCIENTIFIC PAPERS OF PAUL A. SAMUELSON 18, 35 (Robert C. Merton ed., 1972) (emphasis omitted).
96 It does not seem likely that a sclf-interested party will be motivated solely by allocative ends
without regard for distributive outcomes.
97 See Introduction, in THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF RENT SEEKING xi (Robert D. Tollison &
Roger D. Congleton eds., 1995) ("Rent seeking is the socially costly pursuit of transfers."). See general-
ly DAVID RICARDO, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, in I THE WORKS AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO 67-84 (Piero Sraffa ed., 2004) (explaining that economic rent is
the amount paid to a factor of production above the minimum necessary to keep it in its current use).
98 See HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 2, at 185-89 (explaining in more technical terms that
economists refer to all the possible points that would increase the welfare of both parties as a lens, and a
combination of points within the lens is the contract curve).
99 While this would be enough to achieve an allocatively efficient outcome, in the typical contract
case both parties advance their welfare.
100 Rent-seeking behavior involves increasing one's own wealth without creating additional overall
welfare. See THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF RENT SEEKING, supra note 97, at xi ("Transfer seeking is at
best a zero-sum activity in that it simply shuffles dollars among people and groups, and is probably
negative-sum if traditional deadweight costs result as a by-product of such activities .... Rent seeking
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Both Laidlaw v. Organ and Neill v. Shamburg can be interpreted as
exercises in rent-seeking.'' As already noted, Organ's advantage was mere-
ly one of time, and the time between the dissemination of his information
and a more general dissemination was too short to have any important al-
locative effects.'0° The fact that Organ sought out Laidlaw in the early hours
of the day suggests he knew that whatever advantage he had would be short
lived. In all likelihood, even if Laidlaw had demanded a higher price-even
a substantially higher price-the exchange would have still taken place, just
at a different point on the contract curve. In this instance, any use of re-
sources to gain an edge would be deliberate but ultimately wasteful. Simi-
larly, in Neill v. Shamburg, there was likely a range of prices that were ac-
ceptable to both the seller and buyer and which would have achieved a de-
sirable allocative end. Shamburg's desire not to disclose information about
the productivity of his land was likely driven by a desire to affect the distri-
butive outcome again, without a substantial allocative gain.10 3
2. Exploitation of Decision Biases
Perhaps the greatest problem with implementing, or even describing
with some precision, a policy based on the use of information for allocative
or distributive purposes is the difficulty of containing the theory. In particu-
lar, the use of information to acquire rents occupies a broad range of con-
duct. Some toe the line of misrepresentation while others focus on efforts to
disclose no more than is legally necessary. In all cases, the idea is to affect
the perceptions of another party. Once this is understood, it is a simple step
to consider sale techniques. For example, as Christine Jolls and Cass Suns-
tein point out, manufacturers and sellers required to provide product warn-
thus embodies a social cost in terms of foregone product of the resources employed in rent seeking.").
While properly regarded as a type of transaction cost, they are in excess of the minimum necessary to
increase social welfare. See id.
10| As Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen note, information gathering efforts are likely to have both
allocativc and distributive cffects, and they argue that in mixed cases, the contracts should be enforced.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 296. The logic appears to be that refusing to enforce contracts
involving mixed effects would reduce allocative cfficiency. See id. This seems to involve an assumption
that the benefits of the allocative effects will generally exceed the social costs of the distributive efforts.
The reason for this assumption is not clear, and a better approach may be to assess the relative allocative
and distributive effects.
102 See supra notes 38-39, 42-43 and accompanying text.
103 Of course, having discovered oil, the cost of not disclosing it to the seller was probably minim-
al, at least for Shamburg. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of the
case). On the other hand, decisions like Neill v. Shamburg mean the opposing party would be wise to
invest in discovering already known information to achieve a more favorable distributive outcome.
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ings are anxious to take advantage of what is called the "optimism bias."'' "
The optimism bias leads to the belief that bad things happen to others and is
more likely to affect transactions when warning labels are framed in general
terms. °5 In effect, by exploiting the optimism bias, a party does not actually
disclose what he or she purports to disclose. Exploiting the optimism bias is
clearly not one of those cases in which deliberately acquired information is
used for mixed purposes. At best, the use of the information is strictly dis-
tributive. At worst, the tactic may affect perceptions so much that a contract
is formed that leaves a party worse off or is not on the contract curve at
all.
10 6
A similar outcome occurs when a seller or buyer becomes knowledge-
able about framing effects and prospect theory as a way to make a transac-
tion seem more attractive. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky's prospect
theory suggests that people strive to avoid losses more than they strive to
attain gains of the same magnitude. 7 If a proposition can be framed so the
choice appears to be one that involves avoiding a loss, it is likely to be more
attractive. For example, "use product X and avoid those ugly age lines" is a
better sales pitch than "use product X, and you will look young." Ultimate-
ly, however, whether relying on an optimism bias or using a framing tech-
nique, there is an investment that leads that is designed to create a specific
impression favorable to one party and disfavorable to another. 8 The infor-
mation deliberately gathered is not connected to an allocative effect.
There is, of course, a difference between the nondisclosure of the un-
noticed attribute of a valuable painting found at a yard sale and the use of
various sales and advertising strategies in order to make the terms of a
transaction more attractive to another party. Ultimately, the difference is
more formal than real. Both are intended to affect perceptions, and the suc-
cess of each depends on the relative ignorance of one of the parties. Requir-
ing disclosure in these cases would deter rent-seeking efforts and actually
lower social costs. Nevertheless, extending the policy to cover these types
104 See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 207-
08 (2006). "Optimism bias refers to the tendency of people to believe that their own probability of
facing a bad outcome is lower than it actually is." Id. at 204.
105 Id. at 204, 212.
106 In effect, a buyer understanding the true danger might not be willing to purchase even at the
seller's best price.
107 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
108 Of course, the Roald Dahl story, "Parson's Pleasures," reminds us that the possibility of poetic
justice does exist. See supra note 9. There, Mr. Cyril Boggis finally convinced the seller of a valuable
antique Chippendale Commode that it was relatively valueless and that he was only interested in the legs
with the remainder only good for firewood. DAHL, supra note 9, at 251-62. After the deal was struck,
and believing the sales pitch, the seller delivered four legs and the cabinet, broken into pieces suitable
for firewood. Id. at 265-66.
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of nondisclosure would be hard to articulate in a way that would ensure
consistency.'09
3. Nondisclosure of Future Inevitable Development
One line of cases is particularly instructive for illustrating the mistake
of equating deliberately acquired information with allocative, as opposed to
distributive, ends. Interestingly, Professor Kronman cites the cases as sup-
porting nondisclosure. "0 To understand the problem they address, one must
distinguish two scenarios. In the first, as already described, a buyer recog-
nizes a painting at a yard sale that he knows is greatly undervalued and
buys the painting. " ' In the second, a buyer expects a railroad to buy a parcel
of land, causing the price to increase. "2 In the first case, but for the delibe-
rately acquired information, the painting may never find its way to those
who appreciate it. In the second case, nothing the buyer does changes the
destiny of the land.
The general rule in the second group of cases, as it is in the first group,
is that the buyer need not disclose the information to the seller."3 The typi-
cal rationale is that the information was available to either party. "4 It is im-
portant to note, however, that these cases are not concerned with the possi-
bility that the land will be underdeveloped unless the purchase is legiti-
mized. Instead the only issue is which party will acquire the wealth asso-
ciated with the eventual resale to another buyer. In a sense, these cases are a
bit like the race cases " ' in that the intermediate buyer's goal is to beat the
ultimate buyer to the purchase and profit from the increased price. 116
Even though the information in these cases may be acquired at great
expense, the effort is allocatively irrelevant. The land possesses whatever
109 For the best effort to date, see Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 104, at 206-34, discussing disclosure
requirements in various legal contexts.
110 See Kronman, supra note 3, at 21-22.
"I See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
112 See, e.g., Furman v. Brown, 199 N.W. 703, 706 (Mich. 1924) (stating that the area near the land
plaintiff sold "started towards a boom" including "long prayed for development and growth" accompa-
nied by "soaring prices in realty"); Burt v. Mason, 56 N.W. 365, 365 (Mich. 1893) (explaining the
allegation that the defendants knew the land was of "great value" before making the purchase because
the land was "a prospective terminal point for a railroad on account of the fine natural harbor there
located"). These cases are cited by Professor Kronman as examples of deliberately acquired information
leading to allocatively efficient outcomes. See Kronman, supra note 3, at 21 & n.58.
113 See Kronman, supra note 3, at 21.
114 See Burt, 56 N.W. at 367 (stating that the seller "knew the situation as well as" the buyer).
115 See supra Part Il.D.
116 See e.g., Guar. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Liebold, 56 A. 951, 952 (Pa. 1904) (explaining that
the buyer secured the option to purchase the property because of the potential of a large company locat-
ing a plant in an adjacent borough, and that once the plant's location became certain, the buyer exercised
the option). This case is also discussed by Professor Kronman. Kronman, supra note 3, at 21-22.
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quality it possesses as a site for a railroad, shopping center, or highway. The
ultimate use is not altered by the owner of the land or that party's know-
ledge of the future plans of a potential buyer. The only thing that is deter-
mined by the nondisclosure is the party who will acquire the income asso-
ciated with the discovery by a third party that the land possesses desired
characteristics. The investment by the middleman in these transactions is a
social cost in that it advances no socially beneficial allocative ends.'17
4. Information, Distributive Efforts, and Rent-Seeking
The notion that information is acquired primarily or solely to affect the
distributive outcome of a transaction fits nicely within a more general
theory of rent-seeking. In this sense, the social costs are similar to those that
arise from theft and monopoly. Equating these social costs to those of theft
and monopoly may not be intuitively obvious, but the parallel becomes
clear when one considers the works of Gordon Tullock and Richard Posner
on the origins of social costs. In his classic 1967 article, Tullock noted that
the cost of theft does not lie in the transfer of ownership itself."8 In effect, if
one party owns a pen or a car and another takes it, there may or may not be
a welfare loss. In fact, the new owner may attribute greater utility in which
case overall utility increases. Or, the new owner may attribute greater mon-
etary value to the item than the original owner. In either case, aside from
other costs, overall efficiency would increase." 9 Of course, to avoid theft,
people will invest a great deal in security. 2 ° And, to achieve a successful
theft, others will invest in techniques to avoid those very same security
measures.'2 ' The economic cost, therefore, of theft is not in the transfer it-
self but in the resources employed to achieve and avoid theft.'22 These ex-
penditures do not increase wealth; they merely serve to redistribute it or
avoid redistribution. 23
Tullock notes that the same analysis applies to monopoly. As he put it,
"the total costs of monopoly should be measured in terms of the efforts to
get a monopoly by the unsuccessful as well as the successful.' 24 This
theme was further elaborated by Richard Posner in his equally well-known
117 Notice how the analysis may change if the ultimate purchaser does the research to discover the
land is best suited for a highway and thus substitutes higher value use as a highway for a less valuable
farm use.
118 Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopoly, and Theft, supra note 16, at 228-3 1.
119 Utility and wealth maximization would represent different efficiency norms. See supra notes 2,
13, 25.
120 Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopoly, and Theft, supra note 16, at 229-30.
121 Seeid. at 230.
122 id.
123 Id. at 231.
124 Id. at 232.
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article, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation.125 Typically, mono-
poly is viewed as having a number of effects as compared to competition.
Prices increase, output declines, and welfare is both decreased and redistri-
buted.126 In terms of social costs, the welfare effects are more relevant. A
pure loss or welfare loss is a result of the decrease in production of output
that buyers value more than the cost of production.'27 In addition, some out-
put continues to be sold but at a higher price.128 In the case of this output,
the issue is not whether there will be production, but who will enjoy the
profit from the monopoly power that allows the price to be raised. Herein
lies the cost of monopoly to which Tullock and Posner refer. It is the cost of
the efforts to become a monopolist, or to avoid detection, or to protect one's
position as a monopolist.'29 It is important to remember that these are pure
losses-nothing new is produced. 30
The concerns described by Tullock and Posner when it comes to rent-
seeking behavior are equally applicable to efforts to increase one's share of
the gains from an exchange. In fact, the monopoly comparison is particular-
ly appropriate. In that case, investments are made to gain, continue, or ex-
ploit market power resulting in the payment of a price in excess of the com-
petitive price.' 3' It is not the price itself that is the loss-that is a distributive
matter. It is the investment made to create a more favorable price that is the
social loss. A similar loss occurs with deliberately obtained information
resulting in a more favorable exchange. The higher price paid or lower
price accepted by the disfavored party is a distributive matter. The delibe-
rately acquired information that leads to that outcome is a social cost. It is
only a minor simplification to say that in all three cases, costs are expended
on how to divide up already existing or potential wealth.
There is one difference between deliberately acquired information and
the rent-seeking expenses in the case of theft and monopoly. The costs of
theft and monopoly can hardly be viewed as transaction costs. They are not
125 Posner, supra note 17, at 807.
126 See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 20-22 (5th ed. 2009); Posner, supra note 17, at 807.
127 More technically, it is some output where buyers would be willing to pay a price in excess of
the value of the resources that would be consumed in production. See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra
note 126, at 20-21.
128 Id. at20.
129 Patent law and copyright law exist in part because free-riding, perhaps informal theft, exists.
For example, without patent law those with inventions would invest in keeping secrets while others
would invest in attempting to uncover secrets. If social norms precluded taking the works of others,
neither patent law nor copyright law and the expenses associated with each would be necessary. Of
course, patent law and copyright law involve administrative expenses.
130 For a discussion of the social costs associated with copyright law, see generally Harrison, supra
note 11. In fact, even a cursory examination of the Copyright Statute, Title 17 of the United States Code,
reveals that far more of it is designed to resolve distributive questions than to encourage creative efforts.
See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2006).
131 See SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 126, at 21.
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the costs associated with finding and negotiating an exchange. To some
extent, efforts to gain a more favorable term of exchange may be viewed as
a form of transaction cost. If so, it is important to further note that not every
transaction cost is a necessary one. From a social point of view the actual
division of the exchange-once it is beneficial to both parties-is irrele-
vant. It creates no new wealth and is nothing more than a social loss compa-
rable again to the cost of monopoly or theft. It may be a transaction cost,
but it is not one that gives rise to an increase in efficiency.
III. A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO MISTAKE
This Article so far has shown that the common law and default rule in-
volve a set of incentives that are largely insensitive to the question of
whether or not the information produced is consistent with allocative effi-
ciency. In short, the rule itself gives rise to social costs that ideally should
be compared to the resulting gains. This Part takes the analysis a step fur-
ther and examines the potential gains foregone by reliance on the default
rule. The narrowing of the benefits of the default rule can be understood by
again concentrating on a functional approach to information and disclosure.
It is important to recall, as described in the Introduction, that the goal is to
balance the costs of incorrect decisions resulting from asymmetries in in-
formation with the need to allow some exploitation of asymmetries.
The default rule actually involves two questions. First, has a mistake
occurred? Second, was the information possessed by the non-mistaken par-
ty deliberately or casually acquired? Suppose the rule was that all percep-
tion-affecting information that is casually acquired must be disclosed.'32
Note that this covers more than "mistakes." For example, a building con-
tractor will likely know the character of the land upon which a house is
built and will inevitably know the quality of the materials in the house. The
owner of a house will know any factors affecting the value of a house, at
least during the period of ownership. A person having his car serviced may
learn from the mechanic that the car has been involved in a collision or re-
painted. And manufacturers will know the quality of their products and
their expected useful life. Much of this information is both relevant to the
decision of the party not possessing it and would not be labeled as the
source of a "mistake." When disclosure is required, it is not on the basis of
economic relevance but on the basis of a "mistake" having occurred.'33 In
132 It is important to recall that the definition of casually acquired includes information that was
deliberately acquired but for other purposes than the transaction at hand. See supra text accompanying
notes 6-8.
133 In short, sellers will reveal value-enhancing information, leaving the buyers to make the in-
vestment in possible value-decreasing information. Of course, positive features of a product will be
eagerly revealed.
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fact, sellers may invest to avoid the discovery of value-decreasing informa-
tion.
What is missing in the analysis is a functional definition of what a mis-
take is. Or perhaps, more specifically, the definition of mistake has little
economic content. For example, the fact that a mistake occurs when a party
is wrong about a fact'34 misses the point that the opposite party may possess
information that is highly relevant to the opposite party's decision-making
and that the information was acquired casually, even inevitably. In short, if
the casual/deliberate distinction is to have the full economic impact it prom-
ises to deliver, the "mistake" step is unnecessary. There appears to be no
economic downside of requiring disclosure of any information a reasonable
person would regard as relevant to a particular transaction whether the con-
cept of mistake is invoked or not. Obviously, it is impossible to have access
to all relevant information. Moreover, some information would be more
costly to develop than the cost of the mistake itself. In this context, though,
the only information that need be disclosed is that which does exist and was
casually acquired.
Aside from eliminating the issue of what constitutes a mistake, the full
disclosure approach also eliminates the idea that one's duty to disclose may
depend on whether there is a defect and whether it is patent or latent.'35 Like
"mistake," the terms "defect," "latent," and "patent" have no substantive
economic importance. For example, there is nothing defective about the age
of airlines' fleets of planes or the nationality of its pilots, but the informa-
tion is both casually acquired and can be highly relevant.'36 Or, in another
industry, a seller may have done research on the life expectancy of its prod-
uct. Again, there are no defects involved, but the information is both rele-
vant and casually-indeed, inevitably-acquired.
Consequently, a more functional approach to the patent/latent issue is
one that addresses the information issue directly. If the product characteris-
tic is known casually or inevitably by one party, any rule that disclosure is
excused if it was also knowable to the other party makes little economic
sense. The information exists, the costs of obtaining it are sunk, and at that
point, the party with the information is in the best position (i.e., lowest cost)
134 According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, "[a] mistake is a belief that is not in ac-
cord with the facts." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 (1981).
135 See Kronman, supra note 3, at 22-26 (explaining the complexity of determining whether a
defect is patent or latent); see also Johnson, supra note 4, at 96-98 (discussing patent and latent defects
in the context of real property). For a case discussing disclosure of latent material defects in the sale of
real property, see Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 628-29 (Fla. 1985).
136 According to a recent book, the nationality of the pilots may have been the most important
factor in many major plane crashes. MALCOLM GLADWELL, OUTLIERS: THE STORY OF SUCCESS 202-09
(2008) (explaining that cultural norms related to power and authority account for copilots being unwil-
ling to assert themselves when pilots take improper actions).
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to avoid the formation of a contract'37 that does not increase overall
wealth'38 or utility.'39 The patent/latent issue then comes down to whether
one party already possesses information that would be relevant to a reason-
able person and was casually acquired. When the information is possessed,
to the extent formalistic labeling is necessary, it should be regarded as a
"defect" and "latent."
While it makes little economic sense for one party to incur costs to
discover already known information, a broader duty to disclose has even
further-reaching implications. In all of the instances, the impact of a disclo-
sure requirement with respect to negative information will have the impact
of lowering demand or making it more elastic. This may mean the product
sells for a lower price or that the seller improves product quality. In effect,
market corrections are more likely to occur. Thus, like the standard eco-
nomic formulation, 4 ° increased information is likely to lead to better deci-
sions and more efficient allocations.
The principal drawback to extended product-quality information is a
possible inefficiency associated with the actual dissemination of such in-
formation."' Professor Kronman argues that a requirement that one disclose
patent defects raises transaction costs.'42 The idea seems to be that there is
even more information for the other party to examine and some of it will
duplicate what he or she already knows. No doubt this is true, but it does
not fully consider the offsetting gains. For example, issues of what is a de-
fect and then sorting out patent from latent defects also raise costs. A "rele-
vant information to a reasonable person" test seems far simpler. Moreover,
current incentives create a bias in favor of nondisclosure by invoking the
argument that there was not a defect or, if there was, it was patent. In short,
labels like "defect" and "patent" create incentives to underdisclose by shift-
ing the costs to buyers to demonstrate the underdisclosure. Thus, although
transaction costs may be raised with respect to truly patent defects, the ad-
ministrative expenses of distinguishing latent from patent defects would be
eliminated. In addition, and although it is an empirical question, the possi-
bility that one may be overloaded with information about obvious defects
137 In fact, at this point the possessor of the information has the last clear chance of avoiding what
might be regarded as contractual accident.
138 This refers to either a utilitarian or Paretian standard. See supra note 2.
139 This refers to a wealth maximization standard. See supra note 13.
140 The more information available, the more likely resources will be channeled to their most
valued uses. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
141 Recall that the existence of the information is a sunk cost. See supra Part lI.B.
142 Kronman, supra note 3, at 23 ("But if a seller has no reason to know that his buyer is mistaken,
it would be uneconomical to require him to notify the buyer of patent defects, since in all likelihood he
would only be telling the buyer what the buyer already knows. Communications of this sort needlessly
increase transaction costs."). This view appears to be endorsed by Professor Johnson. See Johnson, supra
note 4, at 88-89.
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seems unlikely. In fact, it does not seem likely that there would be much
litigation with respect to "defects" that are truly "patent."
This is not to say that there are not possible inefficiencies to be
avoided. This stems from the fact that there are two levels of relevant in-
formation. Take, for example, a consumer good that can be manufactured
with different qualities of steel. 43 The first level involves what differences
may exist between manufacturers with respect to the grade of steel each one
uses. The second is what the characteristics of that grade of steel are. In the
first instance, the components of the product are manufacturer-specific, and
it makes sense to require individualized disclosure. On the other hand, the
actual characteristics of the steel will be uniform, and there may be econo-
mies of scale associated with public dissemination of the pertinent informa-
tion.1" Nevertheless, it is difficult to articulate a reason for not requiring
disclosure of all information that is casually or inevitably acquired that may
be relevant to the other contracting party. Such a policy does nothing to
discourage investment in information, it may decrease the incentive to con-
ceal information, and it makes for contracts that are more likely to be allo-
catively efficient.
IV. APPROACHES TO NONDISCLOSURE
A. Some Preliminaries
To this point, this Article has sought to make two points. First, while
the distinction between deliberately and casually acquired information has
appeal in terms of economic efficiency, it generates significant social costs
ranging from those associated with races to rent-seeking effects. Second,
the current rule relies on terms like "mistake," "defect," "patent," and "la-
tent," which obscure the substantive economic goal of increasing the avail-
ability of information.
The proper policy can be viewed as existing along a continuum begin-
ning at one end with complete disclosure of all relevant information and
ending at the other with no disclosure requirement. Along this continuum,
there are three positions that deserve consideration. The first is, of course,
the one Professor Kronman says is consistent with the common law and
143 Using another example, the specific information could be the average age of an airline's fleet of
planes. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. The general information would be the correlation
between age and safety.
144 There are free-rider implications when it comes to this general type of information. For an
instance in which the public good character of the information is dealt with through regulation by the
Federal Trade Commission, see Labeling and Advertising of Home Insulation, 16 C.F.R. pt. 460 (2009).
For an explanation of the purpose behind the rules, see Labeling and Advertising of Home Insulation, 44
Fed. Reg. 50,218 (Aug. 27, 1979) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 460).
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which focuses on the casual/deliberate distinction. A second position is one
that accounts for as many of the economic considerations discussed in Parts
II and III of this Article as possible. That approach would greatly narrow
the area of permissible nondisclosure. For simplicity, it will be called the
cost-minimization ("CM") rule. The CM rule achieves or comes much clos-
er to achieving the goals that Professor Kronman attributes to the default
rule. In fact, gains associated with the casual/deliberate rule are maintained
and increased.
A third possibility would be unconditional full disclosure. Unlike the
CM rule, full disclosure does mean sacrificing whatever gains are asso-
ciated with true market-correcting research.'45 Still, it would be superior to
the CM rule if the cost of administering the CM rule exceeds those possible
losses. It may also be superior to the default rule if the losses associated
with foregone true market-correcting research are offset by the administra-
tion costs of the default rule and the social costs discussed in Part II.
All the approaches apply only to information actually possessed by the
nondisclosing party that a reasonable person would deem relevant to the
decision at hand. This point requires some elaboration. The purpose of the
CM rule is just that-to minimize costs. One aspect of this rule is not re-
quiring the nondisclosing party to discover and disclose everything that
would be relevant to any specific party. Thus, nondisclosure based on a
reasonable belief that the information is irrelevant to the other party is con-
sistent with minimizing costs.'46 Just how much potentially relevant infor-
mation remains undisclosed is impossible to know. It is possible, however,
that the amount that may be legitimately concealed is smaller than one
might first imagine. It seems unlikely that assertions that withheld informa-
tion would have been relevant will frequently surprise those who chose to
withhold it.
It is difficult to assess the three policies with any precision. Moreover,
the purpose here is a bit more modest-it is to question whether the default
rule can be improved upon. In the remainder of this Part, the focus is on the
CM rule, particularly with respect to how it may perform relative to the
default rule. The unconditional full disclosure rule will not be examined
further except for a few observations."'
145 As noted, much deliberately acquired information may not be made publicly available. See
supra Part 111.
146 This would excuse the nondiscloser from disclosing information that should be obvious to the
other party.
147 The workings are fairly obvious-it is essentially a per se rule that entitles a party to rescind a
contract if any information which the nondiscloser should reasonably believe is relevant is not disclosed.
Such a rule may seem impractical or rejected out of hand because of the losses associated with delibe-
rately acquired information. Under this policy, even information associated with a search that may lead
to an allocatively efficient outcome would be disclosed. The inability to profit from the investment in
the research would presumably limit any further research. For a number of reasons, it is not clear that it
should be so easily dismissed. Both the default rule and the CM rule are more expensive to administer.
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B. The Cost Minimization Rule
1. The Rule
The cost minimization rule would strictly adhere to the goal of permit-
ting nondisclosure only when it is consistent with positive allocative ends.
Consequently, in a specific transaction, nondisclosure of deliberately ac-
quired information that would be relevant to the opposite party would be
permitted when: (1) the profit from the transaction in question was foresee-
able when the information was acquired;14 (2) the use of the information
has predominately allocative as opposed to distributive effects; (3) the tim-
ing is necessary to achieve positive economic effects because of race cha-
racteristics; and (4) the information was unlikely to be casually acquired or
acquired at a lower cost by the opposite party.
The list may seem onerous at first and likely to lead to high costs of
administration. However, a number of factors offset this. First, the party
seeking to rescind the contract need only establish that the withheld infor-
mation fails any one of these tests. Second, it dispenses with several ques-
tions-was there a mistake? was there a defect?-that are themselves the
sources of social and administrative costs. Finally, any other approach-
which may be no less complex-in one form or another, actually rewards
efforts that are misguided.
2. The Cases
With this background it is useful to examine a number of cases in or-
der to understand the social cost of the current approach to the disclosure
issue. Some of the cases that follow are relied upon by those attesting to the
positive effects of the standard rule. As already noted, it is impossible to
assess as an empirical matter just how often courts permit nondisclosures
that advance allocative ends and when nondisclosure results in a net social
loss. What the general survey undertaken while preparing this Article sug-
gests, but which must be left for future efforts, is that the instances in which
individuals discover and withhold deliberately sought information which
The default rule generates significant social costs along with possible gains. In addition, it is not at all
clear what the magnitude of investment is in a property right (1) that must be shared if a proper request
is made and (2) is truly about upward market corrections as opposed to downward market corrections.
This last point requires some elaboration. Any proposal permitting nondisclosure carries with it the
assumption that the information actually will be eventually reflected in the market. As explained, in the
case of negative information, which this article has argued is the more frequently sought, it may not be
in the private interest of those deliberately acquiring information to reveal it. See supra Part II.C.
148 "Foresecability," in this instance, means that but for this type of anticipated income, the invest-
ment would not have been made. See supra Part II.A.
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result in positive allocative ends are relatively rare. These would be the
cases in which an undervalued resource is discovered. Indeed, nondisclo-
sure seems more likely when it means concealing the fact that an already
owed asset is less valuable than others think and disclosure would simply
lower the wealth of the party opting to remain quiet.
The most appropriate starting place is Laidlaw v. Organ,'49 which can
be quite easily dispensed with-perhaps easier than it was initially. As soon
as Laidlaw was able to demonstrate the information was available more
generally only hours after Organ's nondisclosure, contract rescission would
have been in order. The information available only a short time later was
almost certainly casually acquired. 5' It is difficult to see any positive alloc-
ative effects of allowing Organ to prevail. Indeed, the outcome, if anything,
encourages similar short-term wasteful efforts. 5'
Similarly, rescission may have been appropriate in Neill v. Shamberg'52
under two different ways of interpreting the facts.'53 Clearly, it appears that
Shamberg invested in oil exploration or development.'54 It does not appear
that his studies involved the land he eventually purchased. Because the re-
search concerned the land he owned and may have been conducted even if
he did not acquire the neighboring land at a depressed price, it can be cate-
gorized as casually acquired. Second, if the investment is viewed as delibe-
rate, it is not clear that the possibility of acquiring a full interest in the
neighboring property, at a possibly reduced price, was a foreseeable profit
when the research was conducted. 5 For that to be the causal link, Sham-
burg's investment was based not only on the discovery of oil on one parcel
of land, but also the belief that the discovery could be kept secret from his
co-tenant on the purchased parcel of land.
The CM rule also appears to be superior to the default rule in cases
like Guaranty Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Liebold,'56 discussed by Profes-
sor Kronman as an example of an efficient nondisclosure.'57 In that case, an
149 The facts of the case arc discussed above. See supra notes 35-40, 4243 and accompanying text.
150 Cooter and Ulen express the same view and base it on the likelihood that the information was
casually acquired and that it had little useful allocative effect. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 294-95.
151 There is a parallel here to Tullock's theft analysis in that investments will be made in gathering
information that is of limited or no allocative importance and in avoiding being taken advantage of by
those who have invested in information for that purpose. See Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs,
Monopolies, and Theft, supra note 16, at 231; see also supra Part IL.E.4.
152 The facts of the case are discussed above. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
153 The best interpretation from Shamburg's point of view is that he invested in oil exploration and
development on his property only because he anticipated the possibility of oil being found under the
land of neighbors and that he could purchase that land at a reduced price.
154 Neill v. Shamburg, 27 A. 992, 993 (Pa. 1893).
155 One could carry the analysis one more step. If Shamburg's research was conducted in hopes of
developing the oil on the property he owned, the benefits to the neighboring landowners could be treated
as a "sunk gain." See supra Part ll.B.
156 56 A. 951 (Pa. 1904).
157 See Kronman, supra note 3, at 21-22.
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option was purchased, but the seller resisted transferring the land when the
plaintiff attempted to exercise the option.' The land appreciated in value as
a result of a belief that a manufacturer was to build a plant in the area.'59
The court held for the plaintiff, reasoning that both parties knew of the pos-
sibility of the plant coming to the area and that the price was adjusted ac-
cordingly. 6° The court went on to describe its general approach:
Suppose Reiber [the buyer] had known definitely that the plant was to be established in But-
ler, and Liebold [the seller] had been ignorant of this, was it the duty of the former to dis-
close such information to the latter, and can it be that, without such disclosure, his contract
with Liebold is not enforceable in equity? In this commercial age, options are daily procured
by those in possession of information from which they expect to profit, simply because those
from whom the options are sought are ignorant of it. When the prospective seller knows as
much as the prospective buyer, options can rarely, if ever, be procured, and the rule that
counsel for appellant [the seller] would have us apply would practically abolish them.16
The court's approach suggests that options are ends as opposed to means to
an end of an efficient allocation. Yet, an option may have only distributive
effects. In Liebold, the buyer's actions were unrelated to quality of the land
and whether it eventually would be used as a site for a manufacturing plant
or residences or businesses related to the plant. Put differently, nothing the
buyer of the option did meant the land would find its way to a more effi-
cient use. Liebold has elements of the race problem not necessarily with
respect to overinvestment but with respect to being first when nothing rides
on it other than private gain. 62
An early New York case, Junius Construction Co. v. Cohen,'63 illu-
strates the cost-increasing propensity of the traditional rule that one need
not disclose unless a prior statement has led to a misapprehension. 6 There,
a seller of property revealed that there were plans to construct streets on
each side of the property but not that there was a plan to construct a street
that would split the property.'65 In allowing rescission the court reasoned:
We do not say that the seller was under a duty to mention the projected streets at all. That
question is not here. What we say is merely this, that having undertaken or professed to men-
158 Liebold, 56 A. at 951-52.
159 Id. at 952.
160 Id. at 953-54.
161 Id. at 953.
162 See supra Part II.E.3. Similar in effect is Burt v. Mason, 56 N.W. 365 (Mich. 1893), where the
court held for a buyer who purchased a nearly valueless property in anticipation of a railroad being built
in the area. Id. at 367; see also supra note 112.
163 178 N.E. 672 (N.Y. 1931).
164 Today this would call into play section 161 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. See supra
note 1.
165 Junius, 178 N.E. at 672.
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tion them, he could not fairly stop halfway, listing those that were unimportant and keeping
silent as to the other. 66
While the outcome of the case is correct, the policy announced-that had
the defendant not revealed any information, rescission would not have been
permitted-is likely inconsistent with the default rule and definitely incon-
sistent with the CM rule. First, it is not clear whether the seller's informa-
tion with respect to the planned construction was deliberately or casually
acquired, but it seems likely that the seller acquired the information about
the streets as a matter incidental to purchasing the property. 67 Nevertheless,
even if deliberately acquired, it is hard to equate that research with that
which has any particular allocative effect. Instead, the nondisclosure seems
purely to promote the distributive ends of the seller. Consequently, the de-
fault rule leaves in place an incentive to engage in rent-seeking investment.
The CM rule, on the other hand, would eliminate the incentives that lead to
these social costs. 1
68
A more recent case illustrating the distributive as opposed to the alloc-
ative implications of nondisclosure is In re Embers 86th Street, Inc.,'69 in
which the lessees of a New York property for use as a restaurant needed a
rear egress from the leased property to be able to operate a portion of their
business.7 ° On at least two occasions, they asked the lessor if a "legal"
egress existed and were assured that one did.'71 What was not revealed was
that the rear egress was subject to a license that was terminable at will by
the landlord of an adjoining building and that the license had been termi-
nated prior to the signing of the contract.' Although the court noted that it
was not clear that the lessors knew about the license, it observed that "even
166 Id. at 674.
167 The court does not indicate that such a distinction is relevant. See id.
168 An interesting more recent case that distinguishes Junius is Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d
672 (App. Div. 1991), in which a seller did not disclose to a buyer that she had widely publicized that
her house was inhabited by ghosts. Id. at 674. Evidently, the buyer did not learn of the reputation until
after contracting to buy the house. Id. The seller had not misled the buyer but, according to the court,
owed a duty to the buyer by virtue of publicizing the information to the public. Id. at 677. The court
repeatedly noted that it was exercising its equitable powers. Id. at 674, 675, 677. As Professor Johnson
notes, in the context of real property, many states now have mandatory disclosure requirements that
pertain to information that is casually acquired and redistributive in nature. See Johnson, supra note 4, at
119. For an example, see New York's law requiring the disclosure of forty-eight different items about
the condition of the property. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 462 (McKinney 2006); see also Anderson v.
Meador, 869 N.Y.S.2d 233, 238 (App. Div. 2008) (holding as a matter of law that sellers had committed
an affirmative misrepresentation by knowingly answering incorrectly on the statutory disclosure state-
ment).
169 184 B.R. 892 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
170 Id. at 895-96.
171 Id.
172 Id. Consequently, the fire department barred lessors from operating a portion of the restaurant.
Id. at 896.
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assuming arguendo that Vestergom [the lessor] was aware of the License,
Junius [a prior decision relied on by the lessees and discussed above] does
not support debtor's assertion that he was bound to disclose it."'73 If, in fact,
the lessor did know about the terminable-at-will nature of the license, that
knowledge could have been obtained through a deliberate effort. This in-
formation may have had the market-correcting effect of comparable nega-
tive information, but there would be no incentive to use it "efficiently"
when nondisclosure is permitted.'74
A recent Missouri case similarly illustrates the cost-raising effect of
nondisclosure. In Richards v. ABN AMRO Mortgage Group, Inc., "'75 the
purchaser of land did not realize that thirty feet of it had recently been sold
to a city and that rather than a two lane road in front of his residence, there
would be a four lane road.'76 The buyer did not have the land surveyed, evi-
dently assuming instead that a fence around the property was roughly con-
sistent with the property's borders.'77 The seller knew of the prior sale but
did not disclose.'78 The court ruled against the disappointed buyer reasoning
that ordinary diligence, presumably including a survey, would have re-
vealed the actual property boundaries.'79 In this instance, the information
possessed by the nondisclosing party was obviously casually acquired. 8 °
Because it was negative in nature there was little incentive for the seller to
disclose that what appeared to be the borders of the land were, in fact, mis-
leading. One implication of this holding is that a buyer should incur ex-
penses to discover what was already known. Obviously this is costly and
inconsistent with a beneficial allocative outcome.
Walcutt v. Inform Graphics, Inc.'8 concerned the winding up of an es-
tate in which the defendants were indebted to the deceased.'82 The estate
representative assumed the amounts involved were small and did not know
that the defendants owed $76,000 to the deceased.'83 After a generally
worded settlement, it came to light that the promissory note existed.'84 Upon
that discovery, the estate sought to rescind or reform the release so that it
could recover on the note.'85 The defendants had not disclosed the existence
173 Id. at 899.
174 See supra Part I.C.
175 261 S.W.3d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
176 Id. at 605.
177 See id. at 605,610.
178 See id. at 605. The sales contract included an "as is, where is" clause, but this did not seem to
be a major factor in the court's reasoning. See id. at 611.
179 See id.
180 See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
181 817 P.2d 1353 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
182 See id. at 1354.
183 Id. at 1354-55.
184 See id. at 1355.
185 See id. at 1353-54.
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of the $76,000 debt, and the court held that disclosure was not required. 8 6
The court noted that it was not clear that the attorney representing the de-
fendants knew about the promissory note'87 but concluded "as a matter of
law, that, even if the facts were as plaintiff posits them to be, she is not en-
titled to reformation or rescission of the release."' 88 This appears to be a
case in which one party knew of the other party's mistake as a result of
information that was casually acquired and that could have been disclosed
at no cost. Put in different terms, the defendants knew that what the plaintiff
was selling (i.e., a release) was of greater value than the plaintiff assumed.
One might analogize this to the misplaced masterpiece hypothetical, except
in this case there is no positive allocative outcome.
The nondisclosure issue also arose in Jappe v. Mandt 89 in the context
of the sale of a garbage collection business. The plaintiff purchased the
rights to a garbage collection route from another collection service, but the
city within which the route existed had decided to put a substantial part of
the route up for bids. 90 The plaintiff sought damages claiming that the sel-
ler should have disclosed that the route purchased was likely to become
substantially smaller. 9 ' The court held against the plaintiff, noting that the
seller did not "know" that the city was taking action to choose a different
service to gather at least some of the garbage.'92 Instead, according to the
court, at the time of the sale the possibility was simply "in the wind."' 93
Aside from the fact that it is difficult to identify a principled basis for a rule
that disclosure about a value-decreasing event is not required unless it is
certain to occur, the court was insensitive to the casual/deliberate and the
186 Id. at 1355.
187 Walcutt, 817 P.2d at 1355 ("The strongest inference supported by the summary judgment record
is that Gleaves [defendant's attorney] did not know at the time of the negotiations that Kilkenny [es-
tate's representative] was unaware of the Koski note and that the two lawyers were not talking about the
same things at the times that plaintiff suggests that Gleaves' knowledge was or should have been trig-
gered."). The court, however, did suggest that the evidence tended to favor the conclusion that the
attorney did know. Id. ("If it were necessary to decide, we might be obliged to conclude that there was
enough evidence-although barely so-to support the contrary inference urged by plaintiff.").
188 Id. at 1355.
189 278 P.2d 940 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955). The case is cited by Professor Scheppele as part of the
thesis that the nondisclosure/disclosure decision typically turns on whether the nondisclosing party
possesses inside information. See SCHEPPELE, supra note 4, at 117-19.
190 Jappe, 278 P.2d at 941.
191 Id.
192 See id. at 942 & n.2, 943. The court distinguished a previous decision, Dyke v. Zaiser, 182 P.2d
344 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947), on the basis that in Dyke the contracting party had specific inside infor-
mation about a transaction that would greatly affect the value of what was sold. See Jappe, 278 P.2d at
943 ("[I]n that case the defendant was a city councilman who, by virtue of his position, knew of official
action that had already been decided upon which would be definitely executed within 24 hours and
which would and did have the effect of greatly depreciating the value of the subject matter of the trans-
action.").
193 Jappe, 278 P.2d at 942.
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allocative/distributive issues.'94 As noted earlier, decisions to conceal nega-
tive information, even if deliberately acquired, have none of the socially
beneficial effects that have been claimed for the default rule. 95
A final and more difficult case is Toledano v. O'Connor,' which
seems to be decided correctly but which also illustrates how a more exact-
ing analysis may change one's perspective. The case arose from the revela-
tion in a Vanity Fair article that Mark Felt was the notorious "Deep Throat"
from the Nixon era and Watergate scandal.'97 Felt, his son, and O'Conner
(the author of the article) were the defendants in a suit by deToledano. 9 8
DeToledano was the co-author, along with the senior Felt, of a biography of
Felt published several years before the "Deep Throat" revelations.'99 In
preparation for the article and other possible publications, the defendants
agreed to pay royalties to deToledano for use of parts of the earlier book."'
The parties initially negotiated a royalty amount dependent on how much
material was used, but ultimately deToledano agreed to sell his portion of
the copyright for $5,000 with a subsequent $5,000 payment contingent
upon publication of the rewritten version of the book if it contained material
from the first version.20'
The contract provided that any disputes were to be resolved by arbitra-
tion.2 °2 A disagreement did arise, and the plaintiff sought to rescind the con-
tract based on a number of factors, including the fact that O'Connor, who
was also an attorney, had not disclosed the substantial costs of arbitration to
deToledano, who was at the time of contracting quite elderly.23 According
to the plaintiff, deToledano "had no inkling whatsoever that arbitration
could be a complicated process involving days of hearings, costing the par-
ties hundreds of dollars per hour just for the arbitrator's time. '' 2 4 The con-
tract, according the plaintiff, would not have been signed had deToledano
known the consequences of the arbitration requirement.25 From the descrip-
194 See id. at 942-43.
195 See supra Part II.C.
196 501 F. Supp. 2d 127 (D.D.C. 2007).
197 Id. at 133.
198 Id.
199 ld For the biography, see W. MARK FELT, THE FBI PYRAMID FROM THE INSIDE (1979). The
title page listed only Felt as an author, but it was conceded that deToledano was a co-author. See Tole-
dano, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 134.
200 See Toledano, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 134. Permission was evidently sought in anticipation of the
publication of materials about Felt in connection with the "Deep Throat" revelations. See id
201 Id. at 134-35
202 Id. at 135-36.
203 Seeid. at 137, 144-45.
204 Id. at 144. By this time, deToledano was deceased, and relief was sought by his children. Id. at
137; see also Douglas Martin, Ralph de Toledano, 90, Writer Known as a Nixon Friend, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 2007, at D8 (giving a brief account of deToledano's life and writings).
205 Toledano, 501 F. Supp. at 144.
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tion of the facts, it appears that O'Connor desired the arbitration clause and
more or less made an effort to "sell" it to deToledano. 21
The court rejected deToledano's argument, reasoning that disclosure
was only required if "the facts are known or accessible only to defendant,
and defendant knows they are not known or reasonably discoverable by the
plaintiff. '2°7 It relied on the first comment to section 161 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts,°8 which states: "A Party making a contract is not
expected to tell all that he knows to the other party, even if he knows that
the other party lacks knowledge on some aspects of the transaction."2 9 The
Restatement may reflect the law, but, as described throughout this Article, it
hardly represents an approach that would minimize social costs. In fact,
with respect to relevant information, it has the influence of requiring both
parties to undertake the same research or for one party to invest in research
to acquire information that may have already been acquired at no cost to the
opposite party.
On its face the decision seems to be the correct one, but it may make
sense to frame the case a bit differently in order to understand its relevance
to the disclosure issue. In effect, Felt, his son, and O'Connor made a pur-
chase from deToledano. One of the terms of the exchange, and one they
preferred, was that disputes would be resolved by arbitration. DeToledano's
argument was, in effect, that the payment for his permission to use the ear-
lier book was diminished in value relative to what he had given up.2 1° In a
sense, he had "overpaid" as a consequence of a lack of information. In this
sense, deToledano's argument was like that of the buyer of land from which
thirty feet had been removed or the buyer of a garbage collection business
that was soon to be much smaller. In all cases, information that was not
disclosed would have had a significant impact on the terms of the exchange
or whether the exchange occurred at all.211 Perhaps most importantly, re-
quiring disclosure would result in no social costs or losses unless the non-
206 See id. at 134-35 (showing that O'Connor mentioned the arbitration clause several times ex-
plaining that either party could resolve any disagreements through arbitration and that deToledano
acknowledged the arbitration provision). DeToledano can be distinguished from cases in which a party
claims not to know the contract included an arbitration clause. See, e.g., Brookwood v. Bank of Am., 53
Cal. Rptr. 2d 515, 519 (Ct. App. 1996) (compelling arbitration of plaintiff's wrongful termination suit
even though plaintiff was unaware of the arbitration requirement and did not knowingly agree to arbitra-
tion).
207 Toledano, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 145 (quoting Warner Constr. Corp. v. City of L.A., 466 P.2d 996,
1001 (Cal. 1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This policy is similar to that described in Profes-
sor Scheppele's book. See SCHEPPELE, supra note 4, at 115-19; see also supra note 189 and accompany-
ing text.
208 Toledano, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 145.
209 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 cmt. a (1981).
210 See Toledano, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 144.
211 Of course, at trial the likely argument will be that the decision was affected by the withheld
information. As already noted, this will be a question of whether a reasonable person would have
reacted in the same manner.
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disclosing party did not have any reason to know that the information was
relevant to and unknown by the opposite party.
One interpretation of the case, therefore, is that the defendants "sold"
the plaintiff on the idea of arbitration. It would be irrational for them to do
so unless they felt arbitration was advantageous to them. For example, they
may have had experience with arbitrators and they were almost certainly
the types of repeat players whose knowledgeable choices could influence
the outcome.212 In addition, the experience of the defendants with arbitration
may actually lower their costs of participation and increase the cost of pre-
vailing to the plaintiff. Certainly the defendants' nudging toward arbitration
and the plaintiffs shock when realizing the costs are consistent with this
outcome213 and with the possibility that the defendants sought to raise the
plaintiffs conflict resolution costs relative to their own.
In reexamining the case from this perspective, two things are notewor-
thy. First, to the extent the nudging involved extolling the virtues of arbitra-
tion, the defendants may have already become required to tell the rest of the
story in order to avoid a misrepresentation. Even if that were not the case,
with the one exception noted below, there appears to be no social cost of
requiring disclosure. Clearly the defendants possessed relevant information
that was unknown to the plaintiff. Second, it is hard to imagine a scenario in
which the information was not acquired casually. In fact, regardless of the
outcome of this case or, in all likelihood, any other, there is little chance
that research into the costs and efficacy of arbitration or any alternative
means of dispute resolution would be discouraged. These factors combine
to suggest, quite strongly, that the information was withheld strictly for
distributive ends.
Still, the outcome of the case may still be correct if imposing disclo-
sure would raise social costs. This exception, as noted above, depends on
the costs to the defendants of knowing that the information would be rele-
vant to the plaintiff. Even here though, the defendants' case is weak as an
economic matter. Second, at least some of the defendants had prior dealings
with the plaintiff and obviously knew that he was elderly, not commercially
sophisticated, and not represented by counsel." 4 In addition, he was evi-
212 See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in
Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 238 (1998) ("Em-
ployees lose more frequently when the arbitrator is one the employer has used at least once before.");
Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the
Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 777, 816 (2003)
(finding that "the repeat player effect is caused, not by a lack of due process, but by a fair in-house
process" in which the "[r]epcat player employers isolate and resolve large numbers of meritorious
employee claims through in-house dispute resolution programs, leaving only relatively meritless cases
for appeal to AAA arbitration").
213 Moreover, in most instances the cost of resolution will affect settlement terms.
214 Communications about the contract terms were directly with deToledano. See Toledano, 501 F.
Supp. 2d at 134-36.
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dently concerned about how disagreements would be resolved.25 Finally, as
in most nondisclosure cases, the defendants relied on the fact that their
"property right" in the information only existed by virtue of the fact that
deToledano did not ask for it.
216
CONCLUSION
The common law seems solidly wedded to the idea that disclosure of
relevant information is not required unless there is either a duty by one par-
ty to another or a prior representation that could be misleading by one party
to another." 7 Professor Kronman and others have explained that the rule, in
practice, is actually one that requires disclosure of casually acquired infor-
mation and permits nondisclosure of deliberately acquired information. As
a general matter, so the theory goes, this is consistent with allocative effi-
ciency and social welfare by virtue of allowing gatherers of information to
internalize the profit it generates.
The theory involves a number of assumptions and largely ignores the
social costs of nondisclosure. Nondisclosure can mean there is a race for
information that itself may be inefficient and duplicative. The rule also
permits the nondisclosure of and, thus, encourages the investment in infor-
mation that has strictly distributive and no socially beneficial effects. In
addition, it presupposes that nondisclosure will lead to market corrections
as undervalued goods are discovered and brought into their more valued
uses. In fact, a great deal of deliberate research may be designed to discover
when goods are overvalued or to purposely keep information off the market
to avoid downward market adjustments.
This Article identifies and discusses the social costs of the nondisclo-
sure rule and generally questions the social benefits of research efforts that
are not already protected by intellectual property law. It maintains the. ca-
sual/deliberate distinction but also asks whether the gain from the informa-
tion was foreseeable, whether the information has primarily distributive or
allocative consequences, whether the information will ultimately be re-
vealed to the market, and whether it is the product of a race in which the
winner may not be the most efficient source of market-correcting informa-
tion. This more nuanced approach to nondisclosure is relatively easy to
administer and reduces social costs created by the default rule.
215 See id. at 134-36, 144.
216 See supra text accompanying notes 45-50.
217 This is more clearly reflected in section 161 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981).
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